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Let’s start these remarks, ones not entirely alien to Lacan, that therapeutic “heal-
ing” is a medium rather than a conceptual model, technique, practice, or school. 
Therapeutic “healing” in this sense is a process of re-mediation. Its parameters 
as such are features including intensity, duration, grain, absorptiveness, veri-
similitude, simulation, addictiveness, feedback, entropy, meta-critique, auto-
poeisis, and mutation. In the sense of its con¨guration and constitution as a 
medium, therapeutic re-mediation is free to transpire in books, art museums, 
theaters, cinemas, music and dance halls – indeed, in the street – as well as in 
the “o½cial” consulting o½ce or laboratory. A notion of therapeutic interven-
tion grounded in such values as “absorptiveness” and “mutation” leaves such 
conventional values promulgated in the long-standing intramural struggles over 
methodological dominance as “truth,” “theoretical rigor,” and “clinical e½ca-
cy” temporarily (as in Hofstadter’s telephonic image for recursion) “on hold.”1
As a medium, therapeutic redress opens up its multiple and interactive di-
mensions; it occupies its characteristic spaces (again, the resonant book, con-
cert-hall, or other performance-space as much as the clinical cabinet); it con-
centrates itself in identi¨able nodes, whose circuitry (interferences as well as 
°ows) can be mapped; once in process, it establishes interfaces between a mul-
tiplicity of inputs relevant to and impacting upon the healing process.
At this juncture we can already characterize this battery of interventions as the 
invariably provisional redressing of systematic insult in the process of rendering 
explicit conditions of thwarting and unconditional closure, and opening alter-
nate circuitry to jammed messages and shorted-out initiatives to performance. 
Once under way, the therapeutic intervention, prepossessing to the point of virtu-
1 I am most appreciative to my editors at Bloomsbury Publishing for their gracious permis-
sion to reprint here condensed sections of the A²erword, “Healing, Systematically,” to my 
Playful Intelligence: Digitizing Tradition, Bloomsbury, London 2014. 
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al absorptiveness and verisimilitude, attains a momentum and force ¨eld intrin-
sic to its own process. Systematic “healing” is by its very nature polymorphous, 
and once in process can be stimulated/diverted by multiple inputs. Seeing and 
hearing an opera can exert a profound catalytic eµect upon a conventional (i.e. 
trans-subjective, theoretically coherent) formal therapeutic process already un-
der way. Conversations with “civilians” (i.e. non-clinicians), reading books, or 
pondering theoretical paradigms can consolidate or divert the remediation: both 
when a formal program of therapy persists and when it has been “terminated” 
or temporarily suspended. We are concerned here as much with the ambient cir-
cumstances and intrusions of “healing from systematic insult” – the impact of 
strangers, books, other aesthetic and conceptual experiences, and conversion, 
encountered randomly – as we are with the no doubt informative and edifying 
history of spiritual dysfunction and its inventive remediation. 
The downbeat in the con¨guration of theoretical backdrops as I am here assem-
bling it is far more on the posture, dri², and variegated circuitry of therapeutic 
remediation (and on the switch-oµs between circuits) than it is on its nature, 
sources, authenticity, and ultimate results of the quest for “wholeness” or the 
cessation of pain.
Movement and Melancholia
The most visceral and indispensable virtual window or clearing for healing that 
I could invoke is movement itself, particularly over and against the stasis ensu-
ing from subjection to multiple gravity-sinks of rigidity, from thwarting, writ or 
delivered systematically. The history in which melancholy, for one condition, is 
inextricably bound up with inertia, with a seemingly irreversible break in mo-
mentum, is a particularly long and rich one.
How ironic it may seem that one dramatic spinoµ to this long and varied tradi-
tion of phlegmatic melancholic self-absorption, stasis, and run-on rumination, 
possibly to no good end, transpired in an animal laboratory at the University of 
Pennsylvania, where a researcher named Bernard Seligman produced depres-
sion in dogs by strategically imposing a lid on a wooden box between whose 
partitions the animals had been allowed to jump freely. The laboratory condi-
tions of the experiment, the scienti¨c protocols under which it was carried out, 
allowed of course for the conditions, both of the free circulation between wood-
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en compartments and its withdrawal, to be carefully calibrated and monitored. 
The scienti¨c presupposition of the project articulated itself in the following 
way: the rigors speci¨cally built into the experiment-design would allow for a no 
less objective, methodical, and repeatable parsing and interpretation of the be-
havioral implications, including the temperamental or modal dimension, than 
the careful orchestration of the conditions under which free circulation between 
compartments was permitted and barred. The condition that the arbitrary fore-
closure of initiative produced on the dogs was called “learned helplessness” 
(erlernte Hilosigkeit). Seligman’s learned helplessness experiments achieved 
canonical status in the empirical literature of clinical psychology not only be-
cause of what they added to knowledge regarding the etiology, diagnosis, and 
treatment of one of the major spectrum-conditions under psychology’s purview. 
Their cult status, a major step toward the evolution of cognitive psychothera-
pies, it turns out, also arose because the clinical project a½rmed the relevance 
and indeed indispensability of laboratory trials, above all, the principled ac-
ceptance or rejection of wisdom also available from non-experimental sources 
(e.g. clinical case-studies, intuition, philosophical speculation, data and anal-
yses gathered under the aegis of the “so²” social sciences, notably social psy-
chology and anthropology).
In the language of laboratory experimentation, the “learned helplessness” ¨nd-
ings con¨rmed what had been expressed over so many centuries in radically 
diµerent textual displays:
When an experimentally naïve dog receives an escape avoidance training in a 
shuttle box, it usually responds in this way: at the onset of the ¨rst traumatic 
electric shock, the dog runs frantically about until it accidentally scrambles over 
the barrier and escapes the shock. On the next trial, the dog, running and howl-
ing, crosses the barrier more quickly than before. Eventually, the dog learns to 
avoid shock altogether. ... A dog that has experienced uncontrollable shocks be-
fore avoidance training usually stops running and sits and lies, quietly whining, 
until shock terminates. The dog does not cross the barrier and escape from shock. 
Rather, it seems to give up resisting and to passively accept the shock. On suc-
ceeding trials, the dog continues to fail to make escape movements and it accepts 
as much shock as the experimenter chooses to give. 
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It is too tempting for us ensconced in literature and the arts to dismiss the pro-
duction of depression in another species of mammals, in an experimental envi-
ronment, as everything that Swi² was aiming at in his rendition of the British 
Academy in the third Book of Gulliver’s Travels: as what common sense and ba-
sic human recognition have taught us about melancholy, displaced to the quaint 
trappings of laboratories and the terminologies of science-babble. Nothing that 
we can glean from Seligman et. al.’s recapitulation of the dogs’ experiences has 
not been stated more eloquently, and perhaps on a higher conceptual level than 
the memorable and habitually consulted avatars in this history of melancholy, 
from Theophrastus to Burton. A memorable recent addition to this list is Gregory 
Bateson,2 in his compelling account of familial and mental doublebinds. Selig-
man and his team go on to write:
We believe what ... lies at the heart of depression is this: the depressed patient has 
learned or believes that he cannot control those elements of his life that relieve 
suµering or bring him grati¨cation. In short, he believes that he is helpless. Con-
sider a few of the common precipitating events of his life. What is the meaning of 
job failure or incompetence at school? Frequently it means that all of a person’s 
eµorts have been in vain, his responses have failed to bring about the grati¨cation 
he desires; he cannot ¨nd responses that control reinforcement. When a person 
is rejected by someone he loves, he can no longer control this signi¨cant source 
of grati¨cation and support. When a parent or a lover dies, the bereaved person 
is powerless to produce or in°uence love from the dead person. Physical disease 
and growing old are obvious helplessness experiences. In these conditions, the 
person’s own responses are ineµective and he must rely on the care of others. 
So we would predict that it is not life events per se that produce depression, but 
uncontrollable life-events.3
Depression in these lines is the human twilight to the closed system rendered 
in laboratory materials for the dogs. It is the emotional climate that we would 
expect to ensue from the catastrophe orchestrated by Kleist in his “Earthquake 
in Chile.” It is a measure of Kleist’s perverse irony that for his protagonists’ sake, 
he can appropriate the sudden-onset melancholy ensuing from the disaster. He 
2 Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, U of Chicago P, Chicago 2000, pp. 310-31.
3 Martin E. P. Seligman, et. al., “Learned Helplessness and Depression,” in Essential Papers 
on Depression, ed. James C. Coyne, New York UP, New York 1985, p. 203.
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re¨ts it into an improbable escape-hatch from their arbitrarily dead-end predic-
ament. Gregor Samsa’s own particular transformation, from traveling salesman 
into “giant vermin,” unfortunately preempts him from seeking out therapeutic 
intervention. But the only dri² of his frenetic initial eµorts to adapt and the neg-
ative reinforcement proceeding from all family members save his sister Grete is 
further toward “learned helplessness.” Traumatic catastrophes, the more dev-
astating the better, make for the most vivid imaginative literature. In human 
terms, especially when all escape routes are barred, as in Bateson’s compelling 
account of the double-bind and its familial home, they spawn the full spectrum 
of depressive conditions.
It is in the scene, khōra, and theatrical orchestra of melancholy and depression 
that the most compelling motive arises for tribute to Terpsichore, the muse of 
dance. Classical tragedy, even as the schematic blueprint of systematic closure 
at the deep strata of family kinship, and community, opens the scene where 
the elements of the tragedy receive their choreographic expression, where they 
move. Immoderate desire, obdurate taboo, power, memory, political a½liation 
and interest, revenge: all these ¨nd expression, in character, on the tragic stage, 
which registers the traces of their movement. Tragic catharsis, therefore, con-
sists as much in the sheer dynamics of representational space as in the speci¨c 
negotiations of nobility, trespass, necessity, and communal memory adjudicat-
ed by the play. The open-ended poetic screen that Stéphane Mallarmé devised 
for lyrical expression as late-Capitalism and its technologies dawned, a display 
that could be folded in several directions and could be made to mirror itself.
Of writing in general I would say that it constantly demands the coordination 
between two registers of movement: the horizontal addition of words and the 
vertical a) negotiation of pre-existent grammatical and syntactic structures; and 
b) a search-function for needed signi¨ers °uctuating between memory-stores 
arrayed at diµerent depths. De¨nitively checking eµortless °uidity in either its 
horizontal or vertical ranges of movement, writing, under these conditions, stag-
gers forward. Under optimal conditions of relaxation and attentiveness, it may 
be said to dance, but never eµortlessly. Any palliation emerging in the course 
of cultural composition arises from positive reinforcement in the feedback loop 
between the compositional search for words, also their felicitous arrangement, 
and the tentative, emergent worked object.
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Writing is then, the impossible choreography between grammatical and syntac-
tic structures and constraints and semantic possibility. As ¨tful as any overall 
movement internal to its process and along its overall arc may be, this dynamic, 
with its irreversible movement, invariably feels better than “learned helpless-
ness.” It is replete with regenerative power, if we can wean ourselves from bank-
ing on restorative wholeness or full restitution. What we may well regenerate, 
if we can break our various inertias and move, above all along the panorama of 
annotation and composition, is mutations, hydra-heads, “probe-heads.” It is an 
aria of exhortation, a rallying cry to resume motion at any cost, a movement fore-
closed in various fashions, along the lateral passageways of semiosis, polysemy, 
and homonymy. The expanding thresholds of mathematics are arranged in steps, 
it is true, but the de¨le that these breakthroughs assume is by no means linear 
when mathematics is on task, working through relations that are meaningful. It 
is the devil’s pact that mathematics has closed with movement per se that ena-
bles me to implicate Zen kōans, as we shall see, with an irreducible mathematical 
dimension. Poetry as well pays considerable taxes and impots along the horizon-
tal axis of its articulatory baseline, its grounding in grammar and logic. But then, 
Buddhist monk or terrorist? that it is, poetry disguises the time-bomb that it is 
carrying, the visual resources and tricks that it has enlisted. And if I appeal to 
mathematics in this demonstration, it is as one who, back in the day of primary 
learning, was utterly daunted and humiliated by its unforgiving demand for lin-
ear attentiveness. The mathematics with which I have made my peace as a failed 
acolyte is the expanding matrix of possibility whose experience can be conveyed 
either by a master-narrator (Jorge Luis Borges) or even by an enlightened physi-
cist and computer scientist (Douglas R. Hofstadter). 
The latter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid succeeds, on purely 
literary and theoretical grounds if on no others, as one of the remarkable works 
of interdisciplinarity and intertextuality of the twentieth century. Hofstadter’s 
strategically meandering narrative betrays the meticulous planning of a mas-
ter-teacher; also an uncanny instinct for revelatory examples, woven in their 
full complexity into the braid. Building up with linear meticulousness the log-
ical and numerical steps accounting for cybernetic architecture as processing, 
Hofstadter nonetheless choreographs, in a constant feedback loop, three simul-
taneous and mutually-referential panoramas for scienti¨c discovery and im-
provisation: mathematics’ unavoidable recursion to double-binds (Gödel’s In-
completeness Theorem), variation and fugue in music (Bach); and “impossible” 
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¨guration in graphic art (Escher). The dance between these seemingly inimical 
¨elds is as breathtaking as the pedagogical virtuosity by which Hofstadter can 
“make sense” of computers and the mathematics, physics, and engineering out 
of which they arise. Hofstadter’s master-introduction to Computer Science slow-
ly unfolds through sequentially arranged “lessons,” elaborated in discursive 
prose, in which he takes leave, as the occasion demands, to segue in crablike 
fashion over to Gödel, Escher, or Bach, or to any of the subsidiary interests their 
inventions implicate. 
These core-lessons in mathematical and scienti¨c thinking °uctuate, system-
atically in fact, with fanciful dialogues, a²er the manner of Lewis Carroll’s ¨c-
tion, in which such characters as Achilles, the Tortoise, and the Crab invoke a 
common set of terms and cultural materials as they dramatize alternate expla-
nations to the by no means intuitive account of computers, their functions, and 
their correlatives. At crucial transitional moments in Gödel, Escher, Bach, Hof-
stadter invokes Zen culture and kōans as instances of a radically discontinuous 
thinking that is nevertheless completely at home in the stringing and chunk-
ing that computers must customarily perform; in the non-linear leaps between 
levels of processing that is a basic feature of their architecture and capability. 
“Kōans are supposed to be ‘triggers’ which, though they do not contain enough 
information in themselves to import enlightenment, may possibly be su½cient 
to unlock the mechanisms inside one’s mind that lead to enlightenment.”4 In 
this sentence, Zen kōans help Hofstadter reference a function in a computer that 
may trigger a higher level of processing while not itself encompassing or embod-
ying that higher level. 
Zen Annotation
The briefest of book-marks to underscore that the kōans, compiled in such col-
lections as Mumonkan and Hekiganroku are arranged in a progressive order – 
one simulating the movement toward realization or enlightenment which is the 
aim of the composite aesthetic and political-theological complex of which they 
comprise part. In their arrangement itself, there is an embedded movement or 
progression, but in no way a logical or linear one. It is a fundament of Zen dis-
4 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Vintage Books, New 
York 1979, p. 246.
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cipline that the cues and encounters most material to enlightenment may well 
emanate from the most peripheral outlying areas of thought and purpose. In this 
sense, the untoward steps by which the Mumonkan, say, leads toward its end, is 
a performance of, an allegory, in Walter Benjamin’s sense of the early-modern 
Trauerspiel tradition in European drama, of what we would now call higher-lev-
el processing or thought. In preemptive fashion, the overall movement between 
kōans performs its very end or culmination – a facility for improvisational think-
ing grounded in discontinuous logic, tenuous inferences, and wild associative 
leaps. Not only do the kōans consistently import and activate stunning poetic 
freshness of ¨guration into their reduced scale and minimal stage-trappings; 
the time-lag between their logico-semantic dri², import, or meaning and their 
performative thrust, the virtual illustration that they deliver, is non-existent, or 
at least radically curtailed. It is surely this speed and parsimony of feedback – 
within an overall architecture of astonishing, historically momentous insight 
that inspires Hofstadter to wire the kōans within his “eternal golden braid.” This 
is, generally speaking, the celebration of intelligence and complexity and the 
capacity for synthetic and by no means intuitive thought-processes that mean-
ders, indirectly but smoothly, in and out, in a short-circuit of ongoing mutual 
interactivity, between the traditional scenes of writing for scienti¨c, logical, 
graphic, musical, and poetic inscription.
It is, then, a particular possibility for motion in the generation of di§érance that 
we can trace in the progression from one kōan to the next, between all kōans. It 
is on nothing less than a daunting level of Zen-sensibility (or Zensibility) that the 
Mumonkan sets oµ: To an unspeci¨ed monk’s query as to whether Buddha-na-
ture extends to dogs, Jōshū interjects the Mu-syllable, a shi²er in the direction 
of the emptiness underlying all Being in Zen philosophy. O²en the ¨nal syllable 
in communal chanting, “Mu,” is accentuated by a collective exhalation. The col-
lapse of the lungs a²er such a concerted, voluntary outward breath corporeally 
illustrates “Mu.” One could well argue that the very ¨rst kōan in the Mumonkan 
cycle is in fact the last. There is no question more fundamental and far-reaching 
than whether the Buddha-nature, whose discovery is the ultimate task of Bud-
dhist meditation and practice, extends to “sentient beings” other than humans.
It should be noted that the core text of each kōan, the situation-based anoma-
ly or discovery both registering and prompting what we would now call cogni-
tive (or mathematical) “popping,” is indeed the tersely worded enigma that the 
FV_02_2016.indd   158 3. 01. 17   21:58
159
digital parables
kōans are known to be. Yet Mumon, compiler and editor of the Mumonkan, saw 
¨t to supply the text of every kōan with a commentary in the form of a lyric poem 
even terser and more enigmatic, if that were possible, than the narrative vignette 
in which each emergent enigma is choreographed. The irony of this “explana-
tory” lyric (its poetic format is already suspicious), is that it is just as sublime-
ly arbitrary and mysterious as the situation that provoked it. Many editions of 
the kōans supply supplemental notes, to Mumon’s lyrics as to the stories them-
selves, thus transforming each “unit” into a scene of interpretation replete with 
an “ur-text,” a “canonical” exegesis, and “hypertext” in the form of footnotes. 
The canon of structured but non-linear meditations known as the kōans sets out 
as the embodiment and illustration of emptiness underlying all knowledge and 
social systems; it quickly eventuates, however, into an expansive generator of 
textual and exegetical possibility. The kōans are themselves fated to reside on 
the “jewel-hinged jaw” between austere parsimony and exhilarating expansive 
movement. This double-agency in processes of stark miniaturization and sub-
lime multiplication is precisely what draws Hofstadter to the core-achievements 
in mathematics and physics that ¨nd instantiation in the bodies and circuitry 
of modern computers. Zen meditation and practice becomes, in the purview of 
Gödel, Escher, Bach, another receptive scene of inscription and cultural produc-
tion indelibly scored by the “eternal golden braid.”
The narrative and communicative accouterments to an allegory of enlighten-
ment as non-linear realization have already reached a prodigious level of com-
plexity by the third kōan in the Mumonkan, “Gutei Raises a Finger”:
Whenever Gutei Oshō was asked about Zen, he simply raised his ¨nger. Once a 
visitor asked Gutei’s boy attendant, “What does your master teach?” The boy too 
raised his ¨nger. Hearing of this, Gutei cut oµ the boy’s ¨nger with a knife. The 
boy, screaming with pain, began to run away. Gutei called to him, and when he 
turned around, Gutei raised his ¨nger. The boy suddenly became enlightened.
When Gutei was about to pass away, he said to his assembled monks, “I obtained 
a one-¨nger Zen from Tenryū and used it all my life but still did not exhaust it.” 
When he had ¨nished saying this, he entered into eternal Nirvana.5
5 Katsuki Sekida, Two Zen Classics, Weatherhill, New York 2000, p. 34.
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This kōan and everything that it implicates, turns on the sublime riddle: what 
could “one-¨nger Zen” be; how could it persist in its inexhaustibility, even in 
the hands of an acknowledged master? The coincidence in this vignette of two 
sub-narratives, concerning the teacher and his pupil and the death-scene at 
which his lifetime wisdom can be displayed and tested, adds all the complexity 
needed to frame the enigma of pointing ¨ngers, the lessons they indicate, and 
the diµerence between tangible and absent (“explicit” and “implicit”) ones. On 
the one hand, the kōan acknowledges that at least to one master, all the Zen 
necessary for eternal enlightenment could be reducible to an act and sign (the 
¨nger) of pure indication, indication devoid of content and direction, indica-
tion, hinting, intimation – simply for their own sakes. This is what a master 
could possibly know, but never his juvenile retainer. When the boy attendant 
presumes to mimic Gutei’s wisdom, but without an inkling of understanding, 
having never processed it, the master deprives the pupil of the oµending digit. 
Painful and austere punishment, but the loss of the appendage is not life-threat-
ening. Since the full wisdom of “one-¨nger Zen” inheres in the gesture of indi-
cation itself, a speech-act of “pure” indication, the adherent is amply rewarded 
for this severe discipline in the exchange: loss of ¨nger/sudden enlightenment. 
What has been transacted when the master shows his ¨nger to the pupil, the 
pupil whose corresponding digit has been cut oµ is, precisely, the transmission 
of “one-¨nger Zen.”
What is most recognizably “kōan-like” in this meditative stepping stone is the 
extreme compression enacted by the coincidence between the reduction (or 
consolidation) in the boy’s instrumental digits, and the precipitous, vast aug-
mentation in processing capability signaled by sudden enlightenment. From a 
Western perspective, we may be tempted to import all the dialectics (and sexu-
al, familial baggage) triggered by Freudian castration into the reception of this 
scene. Far more relevant here, it seems, both in terms of Zen philosophy and the 
systems theory underlying cybernetic technology, is the way that the terrain of 
relation and relationality itself is mobilized by the ¨gure of the teaching-¨nger 
(or the corporeal embodiment of the teacher’s pointer). This has a lot to do, I 
think, with Hofstadter’s most productive soldering of Zen into the circuitry of 
“the eternal golden braid.”
“Gutei Raises a Finger” is, then, digital in multiple senses of the word, whether 
the incriminating ¨nger happens to be absent or present. Its “way” (or dri²) 
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points in the direction of enlightenment, among other things, as an apprehen-
sion of “pure” relationality, unfettered by baggage from multiple existential do-
mains, which is a dominant feature of digital organization and operation. Surely 
the possession of a ¨nger is a characteristic deeply rooted in the world of analog 
relations: there is an implicit “one-on-one” between my sense or interest and 
what I am pointing to. But the way of enlightenment intimated by “Gutei Raises 
a Finger” is toward the pure relationality that Anthony Wilden, already in 1972, 
perhaps with greater lucidity than anyone else, recognized as a telling feature of 
the rapidly-emerging regime of digital communications and information: 
The analog computer is an icon or an image of something “real,” whereas the dig-
ital computer’s relation to “reality” is rudimentarily similar to language itself... 
The analog is pregnant with MEANING whereas the digital domain of signi¨ca-
tion is, relatively speaking, somewhat barren. It is almost impossible to trans-
late the rich semantics of the analog into any digital form for communication to 
another organism... The digital, on the other hand, because it is concerned with 
boundaries and because it depends upon arbitrary combination, has all the syn-
tax to be precise and be entirely unambiguous. Thus what the analog gains in 
semantics it loses in syntactic, and what the digital gains in syntactics it loses in 
semantics. Thus it is that because the analog does not possess the syntax neces-
sary to say “No” or to say anything involving “not,” one can REFUSE or REJECT in 
the analog, but one cannot DENY or NEGATE.6
Enlightenment, in terms of “Gutei Raises a Finger” is nothing less than “pop-
ping” out of the analog, but in no de¨nitive way. If Gutei’s young assistant 
achieves instantaneous enlightenment upon Gutei’s displaying the ¨nger that 
the boy no longer possesses, this may be understood, among other possibilities 
as an opening up to him of the domain of digital relationality. Backed by Gutei’s 
coming to terms with “one-¨nger Zen,” the ¨ nger that he points toward his pupil 
is a digital digit. It alone is the transition between analog naming, comparison, 
mapping, division, and distribution, and digital synthesis and programming. 
We mustn’t forget that Mumon applies his own exegetical “body English” to the 
kōan in the form of the lyrical amendment that he appends to it. We should also 
bear in mind that a Buddhist monk, directing interpretation’s tra½c °ow, is no 
6 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure, Tavistock, London 1972, p. 163.
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less susceptible than the rest of us, to injecting his own values. What Mumon 
stresses in his lyrical follow-up to the “case” is how Gutei, by means of his very 
least concerted digital gesture, one-ups his master, Tenryū, in the precipitous 
chasm that he cleaves through worldly banality.
Gutei made a fool of old Tenryū,
Emancipating the boy with a single slice, 
Just as Kyorei cleaved Mount Kasan
To let the Yellow River run through.7
Enlightenment, the free-°owing feedback loop between the analog and digital, 
is nothing less than an indispensable force of nature. Buddhist practice is the 
mindful demolition restoring the freedom of the °ow. In its pronounced non-vi-
olence “one-¨nger Zen” activates the force that will allow water to master earth, 
the Yellow River to truncate Mount Kasan.
A minimal work of narrative art, “Gutei Raises a Finger” activates a full range 
of motifs and scales of articulation calling out for further elaboration. Among 
these are surely: mind (enlightenment)/body (¨nger), mastery/ignorance, men-
tal force (meditation)/physical force, age/youth, death/life, enlightenment/log-
ic, digital/analog. Such complexity stands to be scored along these continuums 
that the results of the deliberation can only be inconsequential – in terms of 
instrumental standards or action-language. If we take this “case” or kōan as a 
single °agstone in a Japanese garden of meditation, progressing “beyond” it 
would not so much involve a de¨nitive proof or inference as much as a sideways 
step to a neighboring narrative environment in which parallel dynamics achieve 
diµerent weightings, emphases, and outcomes. The meditation or movement is 
anything but progressive; it sets out, rather, in a philosophical milieu in which 
the direct application of torque is doomed to inconsequentiality.
Each kōan, then, by dint of its multiple resonances, leads to an unlimited set of 
other kōans, indeed, to ones that may not yet have been devised. It is only in this 
sense that we can turn to Case 5, “Kyōgen’s ‘Man up in a Tree’” as an ex-tension 
of “Gutei Raises a Finger”:
7 Sekida, Two Zen Classics, p. 35.
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Kyōgen Oshō said, “It is like a man up in a tree hanging from a branch with his 
mouth; his hands clasp no bough, his feet rest on no limb. Someone appears un-
der the tree and asks him, “What is the meaning of Bodhidharma’s coming from 
the West?” If he does not answer, he fails to respond to the question. If he does 
answer, he will lose his life. What would you do in such a situation?8
As opposed to “Gutei Raises a Finger,” whose sudden and unanticipated real-
ization is a matter of delight, even if accompanied by pointed physical suµer-
ing, this kōan leads right into the heart of a dead-end. In this respect, the kōan 
has much in common with “Ganto’s Ax,” a text Hofstadter makes much of. The 
tree-man’s choice, between dying in observance of his meditative practice and 
in eµect “killing” his practice (at least putting it on serious hold), is the “dou-
ble-bind” situation whose elaboration by Gregory Bateson shed such illumina-
tion on the mental world of schizos, substance-abusers and the impacted family 
systems that produce such outcroppings. The discourse of deconstruction will 
come up with a term perhaps more philosophically respectable, “aporia,” for 
this kind of a situation. The cleaner term from the Greek enacts deconstruction’s 
overall turn toward the etymological subtext and network self-su½cient in it-
self for programming social possibility and outcomes; a vector leaving tangible 
actors, historical circumstances, and the metaphysically grounded constructs 
prevalent in philosophy and the social sciences behind. The a²ermath of the 
particular “step” taken by “Kyōgen’s ‘Man up in a Tree’” in the Japanese gar-
den is to imprison its taker in the starkest impasse, one whose only “escape” 
is enlightenment itself, an enlightenment, as we already know, that can ensue 
only from the oÖand gesture, a chance misstep, the most random and minor 
detail on which the dream, according to Freud, pivots, the Lacanian “objet petit 
a.” It is no accident that the incriminating question in this “case” mobilizes the 
unboundedness of a directional coordinate, the West. From a Japanese perspec-
tive, it is indeed out of the West, India, that Buddhist philosophy ¨rst made its 
sweep, in the 8th and 9th centuries, via China.
It is within a kōan’s capability to sharply curtail motion, action, and conse-
quence, even while contributing to the cognitive stretching, limbering, and 
de-contracting that is the ongoing thrust of meditation. Interestingly, the supple-
mental “Comment” and “Verse” by Mumon can only reiterate the double-bind 
8 Sekida, Two Zen Classics, p. 38.
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into whose crux the kōan leads us. “Mumon’s Comment” tells us that ¨guring 
the tree-man’s predicament out will be tantamount to giving “life to the way that 
has been dead until this moment and destroy the way that has been alive up to 
now.” If meditative practice can for some reason not come up with the vivifying 
insight, it will be necessary to await the Maitreya Buddha for a resolution to the 
quandary. “Mumon’s Verse,” though, can only castigate Kyōgen for foisting on 
Zen an irredeemably deadly meditation.
Both as narrative engines and as cognitive maps, in their reduced scale and min-
imal accouterments, the kōans open vast domains of meditative possibility; in 
their poetic compression, they clear away morasses of thematic and logical ob-
struction. They slide jarringly, but also tellingly, into one another. Their interac-
tion produces change both along the vertical axis, in sudden “pops” and leaps 
in higher-level processing capability; but also along the horizontal panorama of 
“chunking,” permutation, and combination – of theme, parameter, and scale of 
discrimination. Any composite “map” to the kōans would be a rhizomatic aµair, 
careening randomly and even dramatically from one sector to the next, in one 
geographical coordinate or another, but moving incessantly.
Conclusion
It is to Hofstadter’s enormous credit, in such a work as Gödel, Escher, Bach, that 
he was not only capable of isolating, explicating, and orchestrating the under-
lying processes of structural fabulation, coding, programming, and replication 
common to a bewildering array of scienti¨c and cultural breakthroughs: among 
these, Baroque fugues and canons, two-dimensional graphics, as practiced by 
Escher, with “impossible” three-dimensional features, fanciful literary embroi-
deries on mathematical concepts, such as Lewis Carroll placed in the mouths of 
his characters, the conceptual steps and transpositions that enabled Watson, 
Crick, and their colleagues to “break” the genetic code. To these must surely be 
added the mathematical representation of bubbles and other anomalies in the 
domain of numbers that were ultimately to translate into cybernetic capacities 
for leapfrogging back and forth between diµerent levels of generality, languag-
es, and operating systems. Not only could Hofstadter penetrate the particularity 
of the inventions and transpositions necessary for the signature crystallizations 
in these ¨elds; he fashioned the resonant feedback loop, or, if you will, the 
cognitive DNA, allowing these syntheses and advances in very diµerent ¨elds, 
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scored in diµerent typefaces on very diµerent pages or screens, to be, if not ex-
actly perfectly continuous with one another, to engage in productive mutual 
conversation by means of shared tropes, ¨gures, and dynamics. 
Our debt to Hofstadter is monumental for the lucidity and sanity, already at the 
outset of the cybernetic age, that he contributed in the medium of his pano-
ramic view of 1) the decisive centrality of the underlying codes and languages 
of science and of the communications between them; and, 2) his activation of 
the transcriptions between them already constituting the very possibility for the 
emergent interactive technologies and disciplines. So inventive are the textu-
al features that he installed into Gödel, Escher, Bach, among them an ongoing 
alternation and “dialogue” between more-or-less didactic “lessons” leading to 
an understanding of contemporary Computer Science and its mathematical, 
logical, systematic, architectural, and aesthetic components, and the fanciful 
¨ctive encounters, a la Lewis Carroll, “illustrating” the most salient principles 
and points, that the work warrants a full-°edged literary analysis of its own. 
The movement that Hofstadter launches and marshals to multiple eµects in this 
work is in itself a rejoinder to the melancholic “learned helplessness” that an 
age ¨rst deploying multiple new technologies, each intimidating in its complex-
ity and with side-eµects just as daunting, could well engender. I am arguing 
here that fanciful and inventive movement, such as Hofstadter has harnessed 
from ¨elds including number, logic, music, graphics, Zen, and engineering, is 
itself redress and recompense in the face of increasingly expansive, encompass-
ing, intrusive, and extractive systematic architectures. 
A notable taking-oµ point for the work’s relentless, polymorphous motion is 
the plasticity that Hofstadter ascribes to intelligence itself. Among the de facto 
“rules of intelligence” that Hofstadter posits are the abilities “to respond to situ-
ations very °exibly,” “to make sense out of ambiguous or contradictory messag-
es,” and “to synthesize new concepts by taking old concepts and putting them 
together in new ways.”9 Chief among the intelligent attributes that he dwells on 
is the processing of rules in general:
What sorts of “rules could possibly capture all of what we think of as intelligent 
behavior, however? Certainly there must be rules on all sorts of diµerent levels. 
9 Hofstadter, Gödel Escher, Bach, p. 26.
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There must be many “just plain” rules. There must be “metarules” to modify the 
“just plain” rules; then “metametarules” to modify the metarules, and so on. The 
°exibility of intelligence comes from the enormous number of diµerent rules, and 
levels of rules. The reason that so many on so many levels must exist is that in life, 
a creature is faced with millions of situations of many diµerent types. Some situa-
tions are mixtures of stereotyped situations – thus they require rules for deciding 
which of the “just plain” rules to apply. Some situations cannot be classi¨ed – 
thus there must exist rules for inventing new rules... Strange Loops involving 
rules that change themselves, directly or indirectly, are at the core of intelligence. 
Sometimes the complexity of our minds seems so overwhelming that one feels 
that there can be no solution to the problem of understanding intelligence.10
Among the most endearing of many of Gödel, Escher, Bach’s performance-fea-
tures is its ongoing celebration of human intelligence and its non-species speci¨c 
outcroppings. In signi¨cant respects, Gödel, Escher, Bach is an extended hymn to 
the blessings and remaining potentials of intelligence. It is no exaggeration to say 
that intelligence is the prima mobile of the work; that it articulates and diversi¨es 
itself on many diµerent levels, assuming formats and processes no less special-
ized and diverse. Not only does intelligence address an astonishingly broad set of 
challenges and limits, o²en determining the degree of satisfaction and felicity in 
any historico-epistemological con¨guration that will be achieved. Its preeminent 
characteristic as outlined in the citation immediately above, is maintaining its 
°exibility in the processing of a bewilderingly daunting manifold of rules, rules 
whose interactions – mutual attenuation, or exacerbation, or suspension – are 
o²en more daunting than their speci¨c strictures. It could well be argued that 
the trajectory of Gödel, Escher, Bach is to track the vicissitudes and transforma-
tions of intelligence as it addresses major conundrums in a range of sciences and 
arts, tackles technological challenges in diµerent spheres (sound-reproduction, 
cybernetics), and accommodates itself to unprecedented media.
10 Hofstadter, Gödel Escher, Bach, pp. 26-27. 
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